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Comment  Stephen Yeaple
The foreign activities of American corporations have long been a source 
of concern to both the American public and to American policymakers. 
The list of potential concerns is long. Does the expansion of foreign pro-
duction capabilities abroad threaten the availability of jobs that have tra-
ditionally been ﬁ  lled by American citizens? Does the transfer of technolo-
gies by American corporations to their foreign aﬃliates result in the loss of 
American competitiveness in key industries? What impact does multina-
tional activity have on the balance of payments of the United States? It is 
concerns such as these that have motivated the careful collection of data by 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) over the last several decades 
the on the foreign activities of American multinationals. More recently, 
these traditional concerns about the foreign activities of U.S. multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) on the U.S. economy have been magniﬁ  ed by the rapid 
expansion of economic activity in China.
In this chapter, Professors Bramstetter and Foley argue that assertions fre-
quently made by commentators with respect to the activities of U.S. MNEs 
in China are false. These assertions essentially are of two types. According to 
the ﬁ  rst, the activities of U.S. MNEs have had a substantial impact on Chi-
nese economic development and its integration into the international trad-
ing system. According to the second, the activities of U.S. MNEs in China 540        Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley
have resulted in a substantial diversion of economic activity away from the 
United States and from other countries that host aﬃliates of U.S. MNEs. 
Unfortunately, there is no direct way to falsify these assertions because we 
cannot observe the counterfactual state of the world in which U.S. MNEs 
cannot invest in China. Instead, Professors Bramstetter and Foley ask 
whether the magnitude of activity of U.S. MNEs in China is consistent with 
an important impact on the global structure of economic activity.
The recurring message throughout the paper is that the magnitude of U.S. 
multinational activity into China is quite limited in size and scope. First, 
compared to U.S. multinational activity in traditional hosts, such as Canada, 
Mexico, and the European Union, the activity at the Chinese aﬃliates of 
U.S. corporations does not appear unduly large and so is unlikely to have 
had an unusually large impact on Chinese economic development. Second, 
this activity appears primarily geared toward the Chinese market rather 
than toward serving the American market and so is unlikely to have dis-
placed much economic activity in other countries. Third, there is no direct 
evidence that American ﬁ  rms that increase employment in China reduce 
employment elsewhere, which further reduces the concern that U.S. foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in China diverts economic activity from elsewhere. 
Finally, American research and development (R&D) does not yet appear to 
be in the process of being oﬀshored to China.
The sober assessment of U.S. multinational activity in China provided 
by the authors is well taken. If the popular view is that U.S. multinational 
activity is “large” in the sense that it dwarfs all U.S. multinational activity 
elsewhere, then the popular view is mistaken. However, “large” is not a very 
precise term, and an alternative reading is that U.S. multinational activity is 
reasonably substantial at least according to some metrics. Hence, it may be 
premature to conclude that U.S. FDI in China has been of little importance 
to the Chinese economy or to the economies of other countries.
Consider one particular metric of the size of U.S. MNE activity in China: 
the magnitude of employment at the Chinese aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁ  rms rela-
tive to employment at majority-  owned manufacturing aﬃliates located in 
diﬀerent countries. Table 13C.1 reports employment statistics from the BEA 
for U.S. aﬃliates for the seven host countries in which U.S. MNEs are the 
most active. Table 13C.1 shows the name of the host country and the aggre-
gate manufacturing employment at U.S. aﬃliates by host country. The coun-
tries are listed in order of the size of employment. As the table reveals, China 
is the ﬁ  fth largest according to this metric and second largest among middle-
  income countries. Whether U.S. FDI in China is “small” depends on your 
frame of reference. Surely, U.S. MNEs have a larger impact on the economy 
of Mexico than on the economy of China, but relative to most countries, it 
is not clear that the impact of U.S. MNE activity is unusually small.
Even if one were to conclude that the aggregate employment of U.S. 
manufacturing aﬃliates in China is small, China may still be “large” in spe-
ciﬁ  c industrial categories. Table 13C.2 reports the host country employment Facts and Fallacies about U.S. FDI in China    5 4 1
of U.S. aﬃliates in the computer and electronic product industries. In this 
particular industry, employment by U.S. aﬃliates in China is larger than in 
any other host country. Again, the question of whether in an absolute sense 
Chinese employment is large can be debated, but relative to other countries, 
it is not small.
That China is relatively large in terms of manufacturing employment in 
2004 is all the more impressive given how small China was a decade ago. 
Since 1994, employment at the Chinese aﬃliates of U.S. companies has 
grown 390 percent, which is by far the fastest of any major destination coun-
try! Much of this growth can be thought of as a stock adjustment from very 
low levels of employment in the mid- 1990s to a level consistent with the size 
of the Chinese economy by the turn of the century.
Figure 13C.1 illustrates the diﬀerence between the actual level of manu-
facturing employment (in logarithms) at U.S. aﬃliates and the level predicted 
by a simple gravity equation. The ﬁ  gure reveals that U.S. multinational activ-
ity into China in 1994 was far below the level expected for a country of 
China’s size. By 1999, the gap between actual and predicted disappears, and 
there is little deviation thereafter. Keep in mind, however, that the Chinese 
economy has grown very rapidly over the last four years, and employment 
growth has kept apace. The stock adjustment of the late 1990s may well have 
Table 13C.1  Employment of majority-  owned foreign aﬃliates of U.S. multinational 
enterprises in 2004 (manufacturing)







  France   237.9  
Table 13C.2  Employment of majority-  owned foreign aﬃliates of U.S. multinational 
enterprises in 2004 (computers and electronics)
  Country  
Computers and electronic products 
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1. It would be worthwhile to apply the analysis used to create table 13.8 in Branstetter and 
Foley to individual countries.
inﬂ  ated perceptions about the size of U.S. FDI into China, but given the 
rapid growth of the Chinese economy, it would still seem to be safe to say 
that this expansion has been “large.”
Assessing whether the rapid growth of employment at Chinese aﬃliates 
over the last decade has proven disruptive to other developing countries is 
a tricky exercise. Certainly the perception that China is a threat is strong 
in other middle-  income countries such as Mexico. It is worth noting in 
the case of Mexico, that between 2000 and 2004, when the employment of 
U.S.- owned Chinese manufacturing aﬃliates expanded from approximately 
193,000 to roughly 276,000, the employment of the Mexican manufacturing 
aﬃliates of U.S. ﬁ  rms contracted from about 642,000 to 526,000. Other ex-
amples of contraction can be found as well: employment at U.S. manufactur-
ing aﬃliates in Malaysia contracted from 108,000 in 2000 to 82,000 in 2004. 
Whether there is any direct link between these facts cannot be substantiated 
using the publicly available BEA data, but the fact that employment has 
fallen over this period in other major middle-  income countries makes the 
rapid growth in China all the more impressive.1
An important point made by Professors Bramstetter and Foley is that very 
Fig.  13C.1  The  diﬀerence between actual and predicted log employment at U.S.- 
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little of what is produced by U.S. aﬃliates in China is exported directly back 
to the United States and so is unlikely to have directly resulted in substantial 
American job loss. As is frequently the case in large countries, U.S. aﬃliates 
appear to serve primarily the host- country market. One interesting fact that 
would be useful to explore further is the sales category, “exports to third 
countries.” While the value of total sales of U.S. aﬃliates grew 168 percent 
between 1999 and 2004, the value of exports to third countries has grown 
235 percent. This suggests that U.S.-  owned aﬃliates operating in China are 
increasingly integrated into Asian production networks. To the extent that 
these production networks ultimately result in exports to the United States, 
it may be a bit premature to argue that U.S. FDI in China has had very 
little direct eﬀect on the U.S. economy simply because the volume of direct 
exports is low.
Perhaps the strongest point made by Bramstetter and Foley concerns 
the R&D conducted by U.S. multinationals in China. Here, the hype in the 
popular press appears to be the most out of touch with the facts as pre-
sented in the chapter. It may be a long time before U.S. multinationals can 
be accurately accused of oﬀshoring technology development to China, and 
so American prowess in R&D does not appear to be undermined directly 
by the technology sourcing of American MNEs. It should be pointed out, 
however, that this does not mean that American FDI in China has not had 
an impact on Chinese productivity: technology spillovers and agglomeration 
beneﬁ  ts through upstream suppliers are alternative channels through which 
U.S. FDI could aﬀect the relative productivity of Chinese ﬁ  rms.
In conclusion, as Professors Bramstetter and Foley argue, it is easy to 
overstate the size and activity of U.S. MNEs in China. Public perceptions 
of the role of U.S. ﬁ  rms in oﬀshoring production to China may well be out 
of line with reality and so overstate the economic importance of U.S. MNE 
activity in Chinese economic development. As the authors convincingly 
demonstrate, relative to a “gravity equation” benchmark, the level of U.S. 
multinational activity in China is unexceptional. Further, to the extent that 
multinationals play an important role in Chinese economic development, it 
is probably multinationals originating from other Asian countries such as 
Korea and Japan that have had the largest impact.
China is an exceptional country, however, in terms of its size and in terms 
of its breakneck speed of economic growth. It would be hard to argue that 
events in China have not had wide- ranging economic ramiﬁ  cations through-
out the world. Indeed, the growth of employment at U.S. multinationals in 
China has been exceptionally fast even as it has fallen in other major middle-
 income host countries. It is premature, therefore, to conclude that the ability 
of U.S. ﬁ  rms to invest in China has not resulted in a diversion of economic 
activity, particularly in the case of certain industries, such as computers and 
electronics, and in the case of particular alternative host countries, such as 
Mexico and Malaysia.